$\checkmark$ Domtar Corporation (NYSE: UFS), a forest \& consumer products company, operates two distinct segments: (1) Pulp \& Paper (77\% of consolidated sales and $67.5 \%$ of adj. EBITDA in 2020E); and (2) Personal Care ( $23 \%$ of sales and $32.5 \%$ of adj. EBITDA in 2020E).
$\checkmark$ For background, UFS was previously covered by The Hidden Opportunities Report from March 2017 until its achievement of our fair value estimate in January 2018 (a period in which the stock returned $\sim 39.5 \%$ compared with $16 \%$ and $17 \%$ gains in the S\&P 500 and Russell 2000, respectively). Notably, since January 2018 UFS’s share price has declined $\sim 49 \%$ (compared with a $18 \%$ gain in the S\&P and a $\sim 7.0 \%$ decline in the Russell) albeit with the bulk of the decline occurring amid the pandemic in 2020. Within this context, in August 2020, UFS disclosed a review of potential strategic alternatives for its Personal Care (PC) division, which, as noted in our original report, has a markedly divergent product set and growth profile (as well as requires different manufacturing, technology and marketing strategies) when compared with the company's core-Pulp \& Paper (P\&P) division. Moreover, we continue think the PC segment could garner a premium valuation from a range of strategic partners (while also attracting interest from private equity suitors) and that as a standalone the P\&P segment, which is in the process of repurposing a portion of its production assets toward the attractive packaging sector, could itself become an takeover/go-private target.
$\checkmark$ As such, with shares trading at less than 5.0x 2022E EV/EBITDA and a discount to tangible book value we estimate the stock is undervalued, particularly relative to the potential value creation from the separation/monetization of its PC unit and the potential attractiveness of a standalone $P \& P$ business to strategic acquirers.
$\checkmark$ Considering management commentary, peer, and M\&A valuations as well as discounted cash flows, value of $\$ 38$ per share and $\$ 19$ per share can be assigned to UFS's Pulp \& Paper and Personal Care businesses. Accounting for corporate costs and projected net debt of ~\$20 per share yields a base case sum-of-the-parts value of roughly $\$ 37$ per share (with bull/bear cases of $\sim \$ 31-\$ 42$ per share).

## Domtar Corporation <br> (NYSE: UFS)

Date $(9 / 23 / 20)$
Price \$26.03/share
Market capitalization $\sim$ \$1.45B
Pulp \& Paper: \$38 per share
Personal Care: $\mathbf{\$ 1 9}$ per share
Corporate/Net Debt: (\$20 per share)

## SOTP: \$37 per share*

*SOTP may not add due to rounding

NOTE: This publication could be considered as advocating for corporate restructurings. Authors select companies for this report based on the potential for a future value-unlocking transaction. In many cases, these companies have or could come under activist investor pressure, media scrutiny, or general market speculation that a spin-off or asset sale is possible.


## PCS Research Services

100 Wall Street, 20 $^{\text {th }}$ Floor
New York, NY 10005
(212) 233-0100
www.pcsresearchservices.com


#### Abstract

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## HIDDEN OPPORTUNITIES

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## The Background

Domtar Corporation (NYSE: UFS), based in Fort Mill, SC, has origins dating back to the founding of Burt, Boulton Holdings Ltd., a lumber treating operation, in the U.K. in 1848 and the subsequent founding, in 1903, of Dominion Tar and Chemical Co., which operated a Canadian-based coal tar distillation plant. Over the decades, the company diversified into myriad businesses, including paper, newsprint, containerboard, and packaging, before changing its name to Domtar Ltd. in 1965. In 2007, Domtar merged with Weyerhaeuser's (NYSE: WY) paper business to form Domtar Corporation. In 2008-2012, the company divested non-core assets, including a lumber business, a hardwood pulp mill and a coated groundwood mill, as well as entered the personal care arena. Today, UFS operates two distinct business segments (see Background \#1): (1) Pulp \& Paper ( $77 \%$ of consolidated sales and $67.5 \%$ of adjusted EBITDA in 2020E), which produces pulp and manufactures uncoated free sheet paper; and (2) Personal Care ( $23 \%$ of sales and $32.5 \%$ of adj. EBITDA in 2020E), which makes absorbent hygiene products, such as adult \& infant diapers.

Background \#1 Domtar Corporation: Consolidated Selected Financial Items, 2015-2022E (\$ in millions)

|  | $\underline{2015}$ | $\underline{2016}$ | $\underline{2017}$ | $\underline{2018}$ | $\underline{2019}$ | 2020E | 2021E | $\underline{2022 E}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Revenue: |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Pulp \& paper | \$4,458 | \$4,239 | \$4,216 | \$4,523 | \$4,332 | \$3,504 | \$3,659 | \$3,697 |
| Personal care | \$869 | \$909 | \$996 | \$1,000 | \$953 | \$1,005 | \$1,015 | \$1,036 |
| Intersegment sales | (\$63) | (\$58) | (\$64) | (\$68) | (\$65) | (\$70) | (\$70) | (\$70) |
| Total | \$5,264 | \$5,090 | \$5,148 | \$5,455 | \$5,220 | \$4,439 | \$4,605 | \$4,663 |
| Adjusted operating income: |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Pulp \& paper | \$336 | \$277 | \$246 | \$453 | \$289 | \$54 | \$128 | \$222 |
| Personal care | \$62 | \$59 | \$53 | \$10 | \$31 | \$70 | \$71 | \$73 |
| Corporate | (\$44) | (\$49) | (\$51) | (\$46) | (\$50) | (\$30) | (\$40) | (\$40) |
| Total | \$354 | \$287 | \$248 | \$417 | \$270 | \$94 | \$159 | \$254 |
| Adjusted EBITDA: |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Pulp \& paper | \$633 | \$561 | \$500 | \$691 | \$517 | \$269 | \$338 | \$425 |
| Personal care | \$124 | \$123 | \$120 | \$80 | \$96 | \$129 | \$129 | \$132 |
| Corporate | (\$44) | (\$49) | (\$51) | (\$46) | (\$50) | (\$30) | (\$40) | (\$40) |
| Total | \$713 | \$635 | \$569 | \$725 | \$563 | \$368 | \$428 | \$517 |
| Capital expenditures: |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Pulp \& paper | \$221 | \$287 | \$128 | \$164 | \$220 | \$128 | \$265 | \$275 |
| Personal care | \$57 | \$55 | \$48 | \$37 | \$41 | \$35 | \$41 | \$47 |
| Corporate | \$6 | \$4 | \$4 | \$2 | \$3 | \$2 | \$3 | \$3 |
| Total | \$284 | \$346 | \$180 | \$203 | \$264 | \$165 | \$309 | \$324 |

Source: Company reports, Bloomberg, and Institutional Research Group estimates.

## HIDDEN OPPORTUNITIES

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For context on the following discussion, UFS management has provided some anecdotal 2020 guidance as well as articulated some longer-term financial commentary and targets. Notably, the company withdrew its explicit financial guidance (as well as suspended its dividend and share repurchase programs) in May 2020 with the exception of a capital spending target, which currently stands at $\$ 160-\$ 170$ million (compared with the initial range of $\$ 230-\$ 260$ million; see Background \#2). At least initially, the company's anecdotal commentary suggested that its paper business would be more balanced (given recent capacity closures) in 2020 with modestly lower maintenance expenses (see Background \#2) and that following a challenging year in 2019 pulp prices had likely reached a cyclical bottom (with the medium to long-term fundamentals of the softwood and fluff pulp markets continuing to trend positively amid rising demand and limited capacity expansion). On the personal care side, the 2020 focus was to remain on improving profitability, following the consolidation of its U.S. facility footprint and product/customer portfolio in 2019, amid solid demand in the adult incontinence market and the ramp of a new infant diaper customer. That said, as the COVID-19 pandemic began to unfold UFS implemented a range of cost reductions measures, which in aggregate target $\sim \$ 200$ million of run-rate savings by the end of 2021, as well as acted to reduce inventory, defer a portion of previously planned capital investments and suspend its capital return program (i.e. share repurchases and dividends). As well, in response to the markedly lower demand for paper (amid global office closures and disruptions in commercial printing) the company idled its paper operations at the Ashdown, AR, Kingsport, TN and Hawesville, KY mills as well as took extended downtime at its Johnsonburg, PA and Rothschild, WI facilities, which, in total, effectively represent almost 300,000 tons of annual paper production capacity. Conversely, on the personal care side of the business, the company experienced record demand in 1 Q 2020 (amid so-called "pantry loading" for household items, such as diapers) as well as accelerated margin improvement. In terms of its most recent anecdotal commentary on 2 H 2020 , UFS expects the paper market to remain weak albeit with a degree of incremental recovery in 3 Q 2020 and toward year-end. (In that context, demand improved sequentially in both June and July.) Relatedly, management expects the near-term pulp market will be impacted by seasonal softness as well as elevated global inventories and weak demand trends from the paper market. The Personal Care business is expected to continue benefiting from new customer wins and productivity gains (amid relative stability in raw material costs) in 2 H 2020.

## Background \#2 Domtar Corporation: 2020E Financial Guidance, Selected Items

|  | 2019 | 2020E | 2020E | 2020E |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | Actual | Initial | Previous | Current |
| Maintenance costs | \$508 million | \$485-\$495 million | \$445-\$455 million | - |
| Capital expenditures | \$255 million | \$230-\$260 million | \$140-\$150 million | \$160-\$170 million |
| Depreciation \& amortization | \$293 million | \$290-\$300 million | - | - |
| Interest expense | \$52 million | \$57-\$60 million | \$60-\$62 million | - |
| Income tax rate | $2 \%$ | 20\% - $22 \%$ | 17\%-19\% | - |

Source: Company reports.


## HIDDEN OPPORTUNITIES

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Longer term, UFS has provided estimates for the long-term growth rates of its four primary endmarkets (see Background \#3). Within Pulp \& Paper, UFS projects a steady decline of $3 \%-5 \%$ in Communication Paper, partially offset by growth in Specialty Paper, which is expected to roughly track GDP. Market Pulp is projected to experience a $1 \%-2 \%$ annual advance. Within this market context, particularly in regard to communication paper's secular decline, UFS has articulated a long-term roadmap that could result in $\sim 50 \%$ of its paper production capacity ultimately being converted to produce high-quality containerboard and/or softwood/fluff pulp. (To that end, as will be described in more detail later in this report, the company recently announced that the idled paper operations at its Ashdown, AR facility would be converted to softwood and fluff pulp production and that its Kingsport, TN facility would be repurposed to produce high-quality recycled containerboard.) The company's Personal Care (PC) markets are projected to have a long-term growth rate of $2 \%-4 \%$ annually. (More broadly, the company has articulated the expectation that its PC business has a runway to sales of \$1.3-\$1.5 billion and a "mid-teens" margin profile.)

## Background \#3 Domtar Corporation: Long-Term Growth Rate Projections, by End-Market

|  | Long-term growth rate | \% of sales | \% of sale | \% of sales |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | (2016) | (2018) | (2020E) |
| Pulp \& Paper: |  |  |  |  |
| Communication Paper | (3\%)-(5\%) | 51\% | 48\% | 43\% |
| Specialty Paper | GDP | 12\% | 11\% | 12\% |
| Market Pulp | 1\%-2\% | 19\% | 23\% | 21\% |
| Personal Care: |  |  |  |  |
| Personal Care | 2\%-4\% | 18\% | 18\% | 23\% |

Source: Company reports.


# HIDDEN OPPORTUNITIES 

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## Pulp \& Paper (P\&P)

The Pulp \& Paper segment, which is projected to account for $77 \%$ of consolidated revenue and $67.5 \%$ of adjusted EBITDA in 2020E, produces pulp, including softwood, fluff, and hardwood, as well as manufactures (and markets) uncoated free sheet paper, via a network of 13 pulp and paper mills in the U.S. and Canada. (For reference, fiber-based pulp is the primary raw material used in the production of many kinds of paper.) The division, which is run by Michael Garcia, is headquartered in Fort Mill, SC.

Background \#4 Domtar Corporation: Pulp \& Paper Segment, Selected Items (2016-2022E)
(\$ in millions)

|  |  |  |  |  | 6 mos. | 6 mos. |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $\underline{2016}$ | $\underline{2017}$ | $\underline{2018}$ | $\underline{2019}$ | $\underline{2019}$ | 2020 | $\underline{2020 E}$ | 2021E | $\underline{2022 E}$ |
| Revenue | \$4,239 | \$4,216 | \$4,523 | \$4,332 | \$2,263 | \$1,833 | \$3,504 | \$3,659 | \$3,697 |
| Paper | \$3,251 | \$3,033 | \$3,258 | \$3,208 | \$1,659 | \$1,285 | \$2,481 | \$2,579 | \$2,581 |
| Market pulp | \$930 | \$1,119 | \$1,197 | \$1,059 | \$550 | \$492 | \$953 | \$1,011 | \$1,046 |
| Operating income (as reported) | \$217 | \$250 | \$457 | \$225 | \$212 | \$17 | \$53 | \$128 | \$222 |
| Impairments | \$29 | - | - | \$32 | - | - | - | - | - |
| Restructuring | \$31 | - | - | \$22 | - | \$1 | \$1 | - | - |
| Gain on disposal of equipment | - | (\$4.0) | (\$4.0) | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| Pension settlement | - | = | = | \$10 | - | - | - | - | - |
| Adjusted operating income | \$277 | \$246 | \$453 | \$289 | \$212 | \$18 | \$54 | \$128 | \$222 |
| Depreciation \& amortization | \$284 | \$254 | \$238 | \$228 | \$117 | \$114 | \$215 | \$210 | \$203 |
| Adjusted EBITDA | \$561 | \$500 | \$691 | \$517 | \$329 | \$132 | \$269 | \$338 | \$425 |
| Adjusted operating margin | 6.5\% | 5.8\% | 10.0\% | 6.7\% | 9.4\% | 1.0\% | 1.5\% | 3.5\% | 6.0\% |
| Adjusted EBITDA margin | 13.2\% | 11.9\% | 15.3\% | 11.9\% | 14.5\% | 7.2\% | 7.7\% | 9.3\% | 11.5\% |
| Capital expenditures | \$287 | \$128 | \$164 | \$220 | - | - | \$128 | \$265 | \$275 |
| Shipments: |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Paper - total (in thousands of ST) | 3,144 | 3,000 | 3,080 | 2,838 | 1,461 | 1,172 | 2,274 | 2,329 | 2,296 |
| Communications paper | 2,522 | 2,401 | 2,446 | 2,299 | 1,182 | 935 | 1,816 | 1,862 | 1,824 |
| Specialty and Packaging | 499 | 490 | 525 | 446 | 235 | 203 | 386 | 394 | 397 |
| Paper sourced from 3rd parties | 123 | 109 | 109 | 93 | 44 | 34 | 72 | 74 | 75 |
| Pulp (in thousands of ADMT) | 1,513 | 1,722 | 1,536 | 1,539 | 719 | 816 | 1,731 | 1,749 | 1,766 |

Source: Company reports, Bloomberg, and Institutional Research Group estimates.
On the Pulp front, UFS currently has more than 4 million tons of pulp production capacity, of which more than $50 \%$ is used internally (to make paper). Excess production of $\sim 2$ million tons is sold to third parties on the open market and is expected to generate $\sim 27 \%$ of $\mathrm{P} \& \mathrm{P}$ segment sales in 2020E. (Note: roughly $\$ 0.5$ billion and $\$ 0.2$ million of pulp sales are exports to China and Europe, respectively.) For some market context, following the combination of International Paper (NYSE: IP) with Weyerhaeuser's (NYSE: WY) pulp operations in December 2016, UFS is the third largest producer of fluff pulp. Other players include, Georgia Pacific (a subsidiary of privately held Koch Industries), Arauco (private), the Metsa Group (METSA FH) and the Paper Excellence Group (private). All told, UFS projects Market Pulp to post long-term growth of $1 \%$ 2\% (see Background \#3 and/or Background \#6)

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Given the long-term growth outlook for pulp, particularly against the backdrop of ongoing/secular headwinds in the paper market, UFS spent $\sim \$ 160$ million in 2015-2016 to convert paper-making assets/capacity at its Ashdown, AR mill to produce high-quality "fluff pulp", which is used in absorbent personal care products, such as diapers, as well as "softwood pulp", which is used, in among other things, containerboard. More recently, in August 2020, the company announced that it would spend an incremental $\$ 15-\$ 20$ million over the next 12-14 months to complete the conversion of its Ashdown facility to $100 \%$ softwood and fluff pulp production with potential annual capacity of $\sim 775,000$ air-dried metric tons (ADMT).

On the Paper front, with almost 3 million tons of production capacity, which represents more than $30 \%$ of total North American capacity, UFS is the largest manufacturer of uncoated free sheet paper followed by International Paper (NYSE: IP) with more than $20 \%$ share and Packaging Corp. of America (NYSE: PK), which has an additional $\sim 10 \%$ share. Other players, including Georgia Pacific and Lindsay Goldberg, a private-equity firm that controls paperbrands, such as Pixelle Specialty Solutions and Crown Paper Group, as well as packagingplayers, such as Paccor, Golden West and Schur Flexibles, collectively control an additional $\sim 15 \%$ share of the market. UFS's brands include Cougar, Husky, Lynx, EarthChoice and First Choice. Its top ten customers, which are primarily domestic retailers, merchants, and office equipment manufacturers (see Background \#5), accounted for $\sim 37 \%$ of consolidated sales in 2019, and the company's largest customer, Staples (NASDAQ: SPLS), represented about $11 \%$ of total UFS sales.

Background \#5 Domtar Corporation: Pulp \& Paper Segment, Product Applications \& Distribution

| Type | Uncoated Free Sheet |  |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  |  |  |
|  | Communication Papers |  | Specialty \& Packaging Papers |  |
| Category | Business Papers | Commercial Printing | Publishing Paper |  |
| Application | Photocopies | Commercial Printing | Stationery | Food \& candy packaging |
|  | Office documents | Direct mail | Brochures | Fast foot takeout bags |
|  | Presentations | Pamphlets | Annual reports | Check \& security papers |
|  | Reports | Brochures | Books | Surgical gowns |
|  |  | Cards | Catalogs |  |
|  |  | Posters | Forms \& Envelopes |  |


| Domtar sells to: | Retailers, Merchants, Office Equipment manufacturers, Stationers | Merchants, Converters, End-Users | Converters |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Customer sells to: | Printers, Retailers, Stationers, End-users | Printers, Converters, Merchants, Retailers, End-users | End-users |

Source: Company reports.
Uncoated free sheet paper, for which UFS's ticker is an acronym, is among the most common grades of paper and is typically categorized as either communication paper, which is used for both business and publishing purposes, or as specialty/packaging paper (see Background \#5). The use of communication paper, which includes copy paper as well as book/magazine paper and comprise about $43 \%$ of total sales (and $\sim 80 \%$ of segment paper shipments) in 2020E, remains in secular decline. In fact, UFS estimates the market has contracted more than $50 \%$


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since 2007 and could be expected to continue shrinking at a rate of $3 \%-5 \%$ annually over the long term (see Background \#6). In contrast, the market for specialty paper, which includes packaging (for food and medicine) as well as medical gowns/drapes, sandpaper backing, and other specialized uses and which should comprise $12 \%$ of total sales (and the roughly $17 \%$ of paper shipments) in 2020 E , is projected to have a long-term growth rate roughly in-line with gross domestic product (GDP). (See Background \#6.) Given the dour long-term outlook for communication paper (and management's nearer-term belief that while customer demand will rebound as the global economy reopens it is not likely to reach pre-pandemic levels), UFS recently announced that it would permanently close its manufacturing facility in Port Huron, MI during 1Q 2021 and that it would begin to convert its Kingsport, TN facility toward the production of recycled containerboard, which along with the aforementioned conversion at the Ashdown, AR facility will reduce the company's annual uncoated free sheet paper capacity by $\sim 720,000$ tons (and its overall workforce by $\sim 800$ employees). In terms of the Kingsportconversion, management expects to spend \$300-\$350 million over the next 28-31 months and targets a completion of the project by 1 Q 2023 . Once fully operational, Kingsport is projected to produce $\sim 600,000$ tons of high-quality/strength recycled linerboard (and medium) for use in corrugated packaging. Per management, the containerboard market is a roughly 40 million ton opportunity that is growing at $\sim 2 \%$ (or $\sim 800,000$ tons) annually; moreover, UFS's Kingsport facility is within "a day's drive" of over 60 independent corrugated customers (serving the food \& beverage and e-commerce markets) representing more than 4 million tons of annual containerboard demand.

## Background \#6 Domtar Corporation: Pulp \& Paper Segment, Long-Term Growth Projections

$\underline{\text { Long-term }}$
growth rate $\frac{\% \text { of sales }}{(2016)} \frac{\% \text { of sales }}{(2018)} \frac{\% \text { of sales }}{(2020 \mathrm{E})}$

| Pulp \& Paper: |  |  |  |  |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Communication Paper | $(3 \%)-(5 \%)$ | $51 \%$ | $48 \%$ | $43 \%$ |
| Specialty Paper | GDP | $12 \%$ | $11 \%$ | $12 \%$ |
| Market Pulp | $1 \%-2 \%$ | $19 \%$ | $23 \%$ | $21 \%$ |

Source: Company reports.
On a consolidated basis, following a solid year in 2018 when sales increased $\sim 7.5 \%$ to $\$ 4.5$ billion, in part due to capacity reductions at a competitor, 2019 P\&P segment sales declined $\sim 4 \%$ to $\$ 4.3$ billion. Adjusted operating income fell $36 \%$ to $\$ 289$ million as increased maintenance, freight, raw material, and SG\&A expenses drove a 330-basis-point deterioration in the operating margin to $6.7 \%$, while adjusted EBITDA declined about $25 \%$ to $\$ 517$ million. (See Background \#4.) In 1 H 2020, $\mathrm{P} \& \mathrm{P}$ segment sales declined $19 \%$ to $\$ 1.83$ billion, driven by a $22.5 \%$ decline in paper and a $10.5 \%$ decline in pulp, while adj. EBITDA more than halved to $\$ 132$ million, in part, reflecting an almost $\$ 30$ million loss at the Pulp business. As mentioned earlier, UFS anecdotally expects the paper market to remain weak in 2 H 2020 albeit with incremental improvements in 3Q 2020 and toward year-end. As well, management expects the near-term pulp market will be impacted by seasonal softness along with elevated global inventories and weak demand trends from the paper market. For full-year 2020, we project P\&P segment sales


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will decline roughly $19 \%$ to $\$ 3.5$ billion while adjusted EBITDA roughly halves to $\$ 269$ million (see Background \#4).

For 2021-2020, we project a modest rebound in sales to $\sim \$ 3.7$ billion with adjusted EBITDA of $\$ 425$ million, which, for context, both reflect levels that are well below 2019 results (see Background \#4).

## Personal Care (PC)

The Personal Care segment, which accounted for $23 \%$ of consolidated sales and $32.5 \%$ of adjusted EBITDA in 2020E, is headquartered in Raleigh, NC. The segment was established in 2011 via the acquisition of Attends Healthcare, a manufacturer of primarily Attends branded adult incontinence supplies. Attends was helmed by Michael Fagan, who now runs the PC segment. In subsequent years, UFS focused on building out its personal care business, in large part through a series of acquisitions, including deals to purchase Attends Europe, which is owned and operated separately from the domestic business, and EAM Corp., a non-wovens manufacturer with proprietary technology, in 2012. In 2013, UFS purchased Associated Hygienic Products (AHP), one of the largest domestic suppliers of private label/store brand infant diapers as well as of the Fisher-Price, Fitti, and SleepWell brands. In 2014, the company purchased Laboratorios Indas, Spain's largest provider of branded adult incontinence and infant diaper products, including the Indasec, Bambino, Coral, Addermis Biactiv, and Cicactiv brands. In 2016, UFS acquired Home Delivery Incontinent Supplies Co., a national direct-to-consumer provider of Reassure brand adult incontinence products. (See Background \#7.) Currently, following the consolidation of its facility in Waco, TX during 2Q 2019, UFS operates a network of five production and distribution facilities in the U.S. and Europe. (In terms of its European footprint, UFS's operations are in Aneby, Sweden and Toledo, Spain.)

## Background \#7 Domtar Corporation: Acquisitions in the Personal Care Segment

(currency in millions)

| Announced | Target | Purchase |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | Seller | Price | EV/EBITDA | EV/Sales |
| Aug-11 | Attends Healthcare (U.S./Can.) | KPS Capital Partners | \$315 | 8.1 x | 1.6x |
| Jan-12 | Attends Healthcare (Europe) | Rutland Partners | $€ 180$ | 7.8x | 1.3x |
| May-12 | EAM Corporation | Kinderhook Industries | \$61 | - | 1.4 x |
| May-13 | Associated Hygienic Products | DSGInternational | \$272 | 8.8 x | 0.9x |
| Nov-13 | Laboratorios Indas | Privately-owned | $€ 400$ | 8.7x | 2.1x |
| Aug-16 | Home Delivery Incontinent Supplies | Privately-owned | \$55 | = | 0.8 x |
| Average |  |  |  | 8.3x | 1.3x |

Source: Company reports, Bloomberg, and Institutional Research Group estimates.
Management's decision to aggressively enter the personal care market over the last decade was informed by solid underlying demographic trends, in terms of the overall growth and aging of the population, both in the U.S. and globally. On the aging front, it is estimated by the U.S. Census Bureau that by 2035, roughly 77 million Americans will be 65 or older, representing $\sim 20 \%$ of the U.S. population, and some studies have suggested that nearly one in three people in

[^0]
## HIDDEN OPPORTUNITIES

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that population suffer from incontinence. On the infant front, global population growth and rising standards of living provide a favorable backdrop for increasing use of disposable diapers. All told, UFS expects market demand for its personal care products will grow at a compound annual rate of $2 \%-4 \%$ (comprising roughly $4 \%-5 \%$ growth in the adult incontinence market and $1 \%-2 \%$ growth in the infant diapers market) and that its current asset base provides a clear runway to $\$ 1.3-\$ 1.5$ billion of annual sales. On the margin front, management indicates that the integration of its six previous acquisitions has weighed on profitability in recent years but that EBITDA margins in excess of $15 \%$ (i.e., "mid-to-high teens") are very reasonable for the PC business, particularly as the business continues to scale.

Background \#8 Domtar Corporation: Personal Care Segment, Selected Items (2016-2022E)
(\$ in millions)

|  |  |  |  |  | 6 mos. | 6 mos. |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $\underline{2016}$ | $\underline{2017}$ | $\underline{2018}$ | 2019 | $\underline{2019}$ | $\underline{2020}$ | $\underline{2020 E}$ | $\underline{2021 E}$ | $\underline{\text { 2022E }}$ |
| Revenue | \$909 | \$996 | \$1,000 | \$953 | \$467 | \$495 | \$1,005 | \$1,015 | \$1,036 |
| Operating income (as reported) | \$57 | (\$527) | (\$5) | (\$15) | (\$26) | \$38 | \$70 | \$71 | \$73 |
| Impairments | - | \$578 | \$7 | \$26 | \$25 | - | - | - | - |
| Restructuring | \$1 | \$2 | \$8 | \$20 | \$12 | - | - | - | - |
| Purchase accounting | \$1 | - | - | = | = | = | = | = | - |
| Adjusted operating income | \$59 | \$53 | \$10 | \$31 | \$11 | \$38 | \$70 | \$71 | \$73 |
| Depreciation \& amortization | \$64 | \$67 | \$70 | \$65 | \$30 | \$29 | \$59 | \$58 | \$60 |
| Adjusted EBITDA | \$123 | \$120 | \$80 | \$96 | \$41 | \$67 | \$129 | \$129 | \$132 |
| Operating margin | 6.3\% | -52.9\% | -0.5\% | -1.6\% | -5.6\% | 7.7\% | 7.0\% | 7.0\% | 7.0\% |
| Adjusted operating margin | 6.5\% | 5.3\% | 1.0\% | 3.3\% | 2.4\% | 7.7\% | 7.0\% | 7.0\% | 7.0\% |
| Adjusted EBITDA margin | 13.5\% | 12.0\% | 8.0\% | 10.1\% | 8.8\% | 13.5\% | 12.9\% | 12.8\% | 12.8\% |
| Capital expenditures | \$55 | \$48 | \$37 | \$41 | - | - | \$35 | \$41 | \$47 |

Source: Company reports, Bloomberg, and Institutional Research Group estimates.
In 2019, PC segment sales declined almost $5 \%$ to $\$ 953$ million, driven by a $\sim 3 \%$ decline in volume, which was in part due to UFS's internal customer/product rationalization efforts, as well as a $2 \%$ drag from currency, while adjusted EBITDA improved $20 \%$ to $\$ 96$ million as the company's restructuring (e.g. closure of the Waco, TX facility) and simplification (e.g. concentrating on only the most strategic customers and SKUs) efforts began to gain traction. In 1H 2020, PC segment sales increased $6 \%$ to $\$ 495$ million, primarily driven by increased demand for household products, primarily in 1Q 2020, amid the COVID-19 pandemic, while adj. EBITDA increased almost $65 \%$ to $\$ 67$ million as the company's margin momentum continued to build. As mentioned earlier, UFS expects the PC segment will continue to benefit from new business wins, most notably in the infant diaper segment, and productivity gains (amid relative stability in raw material costs) in 2 H 2020 . For our part, we expect full-year 2020 PC segment sales will increase $5.5 \%$ to roughly $\$ 1$ billion with adjusted EBITDA up almost $35 \%$ to $\$ 129$ million.


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For 2021-2020, we project a conservative top-line CAGR of $\sim 1.5 \%$ to $\$ 1.036$ billion with relative margin stability, implying 2021E adjusted EBITDA of $\$ 132$ million (see Background \#8). (For context, UFS has indicated the longer-term expectation that the PC business could generate $\$ 1.3-\$ 1.5$ billion of sales with a mid-to-high teens EBITDA margin profile.)

## Balance Sheet and Cash Flow

At the end of 2Q 2020, UFS had net debt of roughly $\$ 978$ million, including $\$ 124$ million of cash and $\sim \$ 1.1$ billion of debt. The company had an adjusted net leverage ratio of $\sim 2.4 \mathrm{x}$, which was within its 3.75 x covenant and total liquidity of $\sim \$ 906$ million. (See Background \#9.) In May 2020, the company entered into a $\$ 300$ million term loan agreement that matures in May 2025 and its closest maturity is \$300 million of $4.4 \%$ notes due April 2022.

Background \#9 Domtar Corporation: Balance Sheet Snapshot (\$ in millions, except per share amounts)

|  | $\underline{2016}$ | $\underline{2017}$ | $\underline{2018}$ | $\underline{2019}$ | $\underline{202020}$ |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Cash | $\$ 125$ | $\$ 139$ | $\$ 111$ | $\$ 61$ | $\$ 124$ |

Debt:

| Bank indebtedness | $\$ 12$ | - | - | $\$ 9$ | - |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Current debt | $\$ 63$ | $\$ 1$ | $\$ 1$ | $\$ 1$ | $\$ 13$ |
| Long-term debt | $\underline{\$ 1,218}$ | $\underline{\$ 1,129}$ | $\underline{1} 53$ | $\underline{\$ 938}$ | $\underline{\$ 1,089}$ |
| Total | $\mathbf{\$ 1 , 2 9 3}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 1 , 1 3 0}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 8 5 4}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 9 4 8}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 1 , 1 0 2}$ |
| Net debt | $\mathbf{\$ 1 , 1 6 8}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 9 9 1}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 7 4 3}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 8 8 7}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 9 7 8}$ |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| TTM Leverage ratio | 2.0 x | 2.0 x | 1.2 x | 1.7 x | 2.7 x |
| TTMLeverage ratio, net | $\mathbf{1 . 8 x}$ | $\mathbf{1 . 7 x}$ | $\mathbf{1 . 0 x}$ | $\mathbf{1 . 6 x}$ | $\mathbf{2 . 4 x}$ |
| Debt to equity | $48.3 \%$ | $44.7 \%$ | $33.6 \%$ | $39.9 \%$ | $48.4 \%$ |
| Net debt to equity | $\mathbf{4 3 . 6 \%}$ | $\mathbf{3 9 . 2 \%}$ | $\mathbf{2 9 . 3 \%}$ | $\mathbf{3 7 . 3 \%}$ | $\mathbf{4 3 . 0 \%}$ |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Shareholders equity | $\$ 2,676$ | $\$ 2,529$ | $\$ 2,538$ | $\$ 2,376$ | $\$ 2,277$ |
| Book value/share | $\$ 42.68$ | $\$ 40.33$ | $\$ 40.22$ | $\$ 38.70$ | $\$ 40.88$ |
| Tangible book value | $\$ 1,518$ | $\$ 1,896$ | $\$ 1,941$ | $\$ 1,777$ | $\$ 1,713$ |
| TBV/share | $\mathbf{\$ 2 4 . 2 1}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 3 0 . 2 4}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 3 0 . 7 6}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 2 8 . 9 4}$ | $\mathbf{\$ 3 0 . 7 5}$ |

Source: Company reports.
In 2019, UFS generated $\$ 442$ million in cash from operations and free cash flow of $\$ 188$ million based on net capital spending of $\$ 254$ million (see Background \#11). Looking into 2020, in response to underlying industry conditions amid the COVID-19 pandemic, UFS tempered its capital spending expectations to $\$ 160-\$ 170$ million (from its initial budget of $\$ 230-\$ 260$ million); as well, the company suspended its quarterly dividend (formerly $\$ 0.455$ per share, which would have implied a $\sim 6 \%$ yield) as well as its share repurchase program (see Background \#11). Longer term, management has indicated that maintenance capex in Paper \& Pulp is likely

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to be in the $\$ 120-\$ 150$ range million annually and that at Personal Care, capital spending is likely to be in the range of $3 \%-5 \%$ of segment sales. That said, as noted earlier, the company expects to spend $\$ 300-\$ 350$ million, primarily in 2021-2022, to re-purpose its Kingsport, TN facility toward containerboard production (away from uncoated free sheet paper).

## Background \#10 Domtar Corporation: Sources and Uses of Cash Flow

(\$ in millions; shares in millions)

|  |  |  |  |  | $\begin{array}{r} 6 \mathrm{mos} . \\ \underline{\mathbf{2 0 1 9}} \\ \hline \end{array}$ | 6 mos. |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | $\underline{2016}$ | $\underline{2017}$ | $\underline{2018}$ | $\underline{2019}$ |  | $\underline{2020}$ | 2020E | 2021E | $\underline{\text { 2022E }}$ |
| Net income | \$128 | (\$258) | \$283 | \$84 | \$98 | \$24 | \$31 | \$79 | \$155 |
| Depreciation \& amortization | \$348 | \$321 | \$308 | \$293 | \$147 | \$143 | \$274 | \$269 | \$263 |
| Other | (\$11) | \$386 | (\$37) | \$65 | (\$71) | (\$12) | (\$25) | (\$20) | (\$20) |
| Cash flow from operations | \$465 | \$449 | \$554 | \$442 | \$174 | \$155 | \$280 | \$328 | \$398 |
| Additions of property, plant \& equip. | (\$347) | (\$182) | (\$195) | (\$255) | (\$101) | (\$102) | (\$165) | (\$309) | (\$324) |
| Proceeds from sale of PP\&E | \$1 | \$19 | \$5 | \$1 | \$1 | \$0 | \$0 | \$0 | \$0 |
| Capital expenditures, net | (\$346) | (\$163) | (\$190) | (\$254) | (\$100) | (\$102) | (\$165) | (\$309) | (\$324) |
| Free cash flow | \$119 | \$286 | \$364 | \$188 | \$74 | \$53 | \$115 | \$19 | \$74 |
| FCF/share | \$1.90 | \$4.56 | \$5.77 | \$3.06 | \$1.17 | \$0.95 | \$2.06 | \$0.34 | \$1.33 |
| Acquisitions | (\$46) | (\$8) | - | - | - | (\$30) | (\$30) | \$0 | \$0 |
| Dividends | (\$102) | (\$104) | (\$108) | (\$110) | (\$55) | (\$51) | (\$51) | \$0 | \$0 |
| Repurchases | (\$10) | \$0 | \$0 | (\$219) | (\$8) | (\$59) | (\$59) | \$0 | \$0 |
| Diluted shares | 62.7 | 62.7 | 63.1 | 61.4 | 63.3 | 55.7 | 55.7 | 55.7 | 55.7 |

Source: Company reports, Bloomberg, and Institutional Research Group estimates.
Additionally, despite the recent steps UFS has taken to preserve liquidity during the current period of uncertainty management remains broadly committed to returning $\sim 50 \%$ of free cash flow to shareholders in the form of dividends and share repurchases over the long-term.

## Background \#11 Domtar Corporation: Share Repurchase History, 2012-1H 2020

(shares in millions; \$ in millions, except prices)

|  | \# of shares |  | Avg. price | Total cost |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 1.8 | $\$ 33.05$ | $\$ 59.4$ |  |
| 2019 | 6.2 | $\$ 35.29$ | $\$ 219.5$ |  |
| 2018 | - | - | - |  |
| 2017 | - | - | - |  |
| 2016 | 0.3 | $\$ 32.21$ | $\$ 9.8$ |  |
| 2015 | 1.2 | $\$ 41.40$ | $\$ 50.1$ |  |
| 2014 | 1.0 | $\$ 38.59$ | $\$ 38.5$ |  |
| 2013 | 5.0 | $\$ 36.55$ | $\$ 183.5$ |  |
| 2012 | 4.0 | $\$ 39.16$ | $\$ 156.7$ |  |

Source: Company reports.


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## The Breakdown

Based on the guidance, commentary, and forecasts discussed throughout this report, it can be reasonably projected that UFS could generate 2022E sales and adjusted EBITDA of ~\$4.66 billion and $\$ 517$ million, respectively (see Breakdown \#1). For context, the current consensus forecast, per Bloomberg, for 2022E EBITDA is $\sim \$ 589$ million.

Breakdown \#1 Domtar Corporation: Adjusted 2015-2019 Results and 2020-2022E Forecasts (\$ in millions)


Source: Company reports, Bloomberg, and Institutional Research Group estimates.


## HIDDEN OPPORTUNITIES

## Breakdown \#2 Domtar Corporation: Public Comparables

(currency in millions, except per share amounts; shares in millions)

|  | Domtar Corp | Cascades Inc | $\underset{\substack{\mathrm{PH} \\ \text { Glatfelter } \mathrm{C}_{0}}}{\text { and }}$ | International | Neenah Inc | Packaging Corp of America | $\begin{gathered} \text { Resolute } \\ \text { Forest } \\ \text { Products Inc } \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { Stora Enso } \\ \text { Oyj } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { UPM- } \\ \text { Kymmene } \\ \text { Oyj } \end{gathered}$ | Canfor Pulp Products Inc | $\begin{gathered} \text { Metsa Board } \\ \text { Oyj } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { Mercer } \\ \text { International } \\ \text { Inc } \end{gathered}$ | Suzano SA |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Ticker | UFS | CAS CN | GLT | IP | NP | PKG | RFP | STERV FH | UPM FH | Cexcn | METSAFH | MERC | SUZB3 BZ |
| Price (as of 9/23/20 close) | \$26.03 | 14.15 | 13.00 | 39.27 | 36.89 | 104.15 | 4.41 | 13.64 | 26.42 | 4.56 | 6.94 | 6.51 | 46.63 |
| Market Capitalization | 1,436.7 | 1,344.5 | 576.8 | 15,436.8 | 619.8 | 9,877.1 | 379.6 | 10,846.7 | 14,101.3 | 297.5 | 2,480.2 | 428.8 | 63,475.7 |
| Ev | 2,504.7 | 3,664.5 | 847.7 | 24,485.8 | 997.1 | 11,634.0 | 1,044.6 | 14,186.7 | 14,732.3 | 294.2 | 2,785.0 | 1,288.2 | 136,894.0 |
| Revenue 2019A | 5,220.0 | 4,994.6 | 912.5 | 22.431 .8 | 948.0 | 6,946.3 | 2,967.8 | 10,076.8 | 10,302.7 | 1,097.7 | 1,922.3 | 1,606.7 | 25,476.3 |
| Revenue 2020 | 4,439.1 | 5,105.2 | 901.5 | 20,289,1 | 773.0 | 6,508.6 | 2,777.8 | 8,714.6 | 8,727.9 | 1,015.3 | 1,856.0 | 1,397.7 | 29,446.8 |
| Revenue 2021 E | 4,60.8 | 5,178.6 | 937.0 | 20,392.9 | 842.7 | ${ }_{6,586.6}$ | 2,985.0 | 9,042.2 | 8,9593 | 1,188.3 | 1,903.4 | 1,555.3 | 33,153.3 |
| Revenue 2022 E | 4,66.9 |  |  | 20,150.0 |  | 6,617.5 |  | 9,22.0 | 9,210. 2 |  | 1,948.1 | 1,781.0 | 34,409.2 |
| EVSales 2019 | 0.5x | 0.7x | 0.9x | $1.11 \times$ | 1.1 x | 1.7x | 0.4 x | 1.4 x | 1.4 x | 0.3x | 1.4 x | 0.8x | 5.4x |
| EVSSales 2020 | 0.6x | 0.7x | 0.9x | 1.2x | 1.3x | 1.8x | 0.4x | 1.6x | 1.7x | 0.3x | 1.5x | 0.9x | 4.6 x |
| EV/Sales 2021E | 0.5x | 0.7x | 0.9x | 1.2x | 1.2x | 1.8x | 0.3x | 1.6x | 1.6x | 0.2x | 1.5 x | 0.8x | 4.1x |
| EVSales 2022 | 0.5x | - |  | 1.2x | - | 1.8x |  | 1.5x | 1.6x |  | 1.4 x | 0.7x | 4.0x |
| 2019 A EBITDA | 563.0 | 592.3 | 111.5 | 3,786.7 | 123.0 | 1,447.2 | 205.8 | 1,56.1 | 1,817.4 | 70.2 | 284.0 | 237.2 | 10,849,0 |
| 2020 Ebitda | 368.2 | 653.5 | 117.0 | 2.883 .7 | 87.9 | 1,154.8 | 249.0 | 1,287.6 | 1,3669 | 48.5 | 281.9 | 169.2 | 13,833.3 |
| 2021 Ebitda | 428.0 | 611.0 | 121.0 | 2,817.3 | 109.5 | 1,175.6 | 287.7 | 1,520.6 | 1,54.0 | 112.0 | 301.4 | 211.6 | 17,581.4 |
| 2022 EbBITDA | 517.2 | 636.0 |  | 2.864 .5 | - | 1,101.5 | - | 1,668.9 | 1,657.5 | - | 304.2 | 409.0 | 17,797.8 |
| 2019A EBITDA Margin | 10.8\% | 11.9\% | 12.2\% | 16.9\% | 13.0\% | 20.8\% | 6.9\% | 15.5\% | 17.6\% | 6.4\% | 14.8\% | 14.8\% | 42.6\% |
| 2020EEBITDA Margin | 8.3\% | 12.8\% | 13.0\% | 14.2\% | 11.4\% | 17.7\% | 9.0\% | 14.8\% | 15.3\% | 4.8\% | 15.2\% | 12.1\% | 47.0\% |
| 2021 Ebitda Margin | 9.3\% | 11.8\% | 12.9\% | 13.8\% | 13.0\% | 17.8\% | 9.6\% | 16.8\% | 17.2\% | 9.4\% | 15.8\% | 13.6\% | 53.0\% |
| 2022EEBITDA Margin | 11.1\% | - |  | 14.2\% | - | 16.6\% | - | 18.1\% | 18.0\% | - | 15.6\% | 23.0\% | 51.7\% |
| 2019A EV/EBITDA | 4.4x | 6.2 x | $7.6 x$ | 6.5x | 8.1 x | 8.0x | $5.1 x$ | 9.1x | 8.1x | 4.2x | 9.8x | 5.4x | 12.6 x |
| 2020EEV/EBITDA | 6.8x | $5.6 x$ | 7.2x | 8.5 x | 11.3x | 10.18 | 4.2 x | 11.0x | 11.0x | $6.1 \times$ | 9.9x | 7.6x | 9.9x |
| 2021 EVVEBITDA | 5.9x | 6.0 x | 7.0x | 8.7x | $9.1 \times$ | 9.9x | 3.68 | 9.3x | 9.5x | 2.6x | 9.2x | $6.1 \times$ | 7.8x |
| 2022EEVEEBITDA | 4.8x | 5.8x |  | 8.5x | - | 10.6x | - | 8.5x | 8.9x | - | 9.2 x | 3.1x | 7.7x |
| Average, ex.UFS |  | 7.8 x |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 2019 APS | \$1.78 | \$0.94 | 50.73 | 54.37 | \$3.41 | \$7.64 | (50.19) | 50.78 | \$2.02 | (50.43) | \$0.41 | \$0.31 | (52.29) |
| 2020EPPS | 50.55 | \$1.64 | \$0.78 | 52.55 | \$1.62 | \$5.36 | \$0.38 | S0.49 | \$1.29 | (50.26) | \$0.38 | (50.36) | (\$10.81) |
| 2021 EPPS | \$1.42 | \$1.54 | \$0.84 | 52.53 | \$275 | \$5.48 | \$0.78 | 50.77 | \$1.56 | \$0.26 | \$0.44 | 50.38 | 55.23 |
| 2022EEPS | \$2.79 | \$1.44 |  | \$2.64 | - | \$5.33 |  | 50.94 | \$1.68 |  | \$0.45 | \$2.46 | 53.75 |
| P/E2019A | 14.7x | 15.1x | 17.8x | 9.0x | 10.8x | 13.6x | - | 17.5x | 13.1x |  | 16.9x | 21.1 x | - |
| PIE 2020 | 47.3x | $8.6 x$ | 16.8x | 15.4x | 22.7x | 19.4x | 11.7 x | $28.1 \times$ | 20.5x | - | 18.5x | -18.1x |  |
| PIE 2021E | 18.3x | 9.2 x | 15.5x | 15.5x | 13.4 x | 19.0x | $5.6 x$ | 17.6x | 17.0x | 17.5x | 159x | 17.1x | 8.9x |
| PIE 2022E | 9.3x | 9.8x |  | 149x | - | 19.5x | - | 14.6x | 15.8x | - | 15.4x | 2.6x | 12.5x |
| 2021 FFCF Yield | 1.3\% | 8.6\% | 8.7\% | 9.6\% | - | 5.6\% | 3.9\% | 5.3\% | - | 5.6\% | 2.4\% | - | 11.2\% |
| 2022EFCF Yield | 5.1\% | - | - | - | - | - | - | 6.3\% | 1.0\% | - | 5.1\% | 47.2\% | 15.4\% |
| 2022EFree Cash Flow | 74.2 | - | - | . | - | - | - | 676.8 | 140.0 | - | 126.2 | 202.2 | 9,674.1 |
| 2022EFCF Per Share | \$1.33 | - | - | . | . | - |  | 50.86 | 50.26 | - | $\$ 0.35$ | \$3.07 | 57.17 |
| 2022EP/FCF | 19.5x | - | - | - | - | - | - | 159x | 100.6x | - | 19.6x | 2.1x | 6.5x |
| P/B | 0.6x | ${ }^{0.9 x}$ | 1.1 x | 2.2x | 1.7x | 3.2x | 0.3x | 1.5x | 1.5x | 0.5x | 1.9x | 0.9x | 25.3x |
| Leverage ratio, net | 2.4 x | 3.6x |  | 3.2x | - | 1.6x | - | 2.0x | 0.4x | - | 1.0x | 2.1x | 4.1x |


| Asaleo Care Ltd | Essity AB | Hengan International Group CoLtd | KimberlyClark Corp | $\begin{gathered} \text { Ontex Group } \\ \mathrm{NV} \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { Procter \& } \\ \text { Gamble } \\ \text { Co/The } \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { Srenska } \\ \text { Cellulosa AB } \\ \text { SCA } \\ \hline \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Unicharm } \\ & \text { Corp } \end{aligned}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| AHYAU | EsSTTYB SS | 1044 HK | кмв | ONTEXBB | PG | SCABS | 8113 JP |
| 1.03 | 306.00 | 56.55 | 144.82 | 11.88 | 136.31 | 121.35 | 4,67.00 |
| 559.4 | $214,916.8$ | 67,276.8 | 49,390.4 | 978.3 | 339,360.3 | 85,723.4 | 2,903,642.1 |
| 704.0 | 267,146.8 | 60,848.7 | 56,271.4 | 1,831.6 | 360,044.3 | 95,042.4 | 2,833,811.1 |
| 415.5 | 128,514,7 | 21,870.5 | 18,426.6 | 2,286.3 | 67,424.0 | 20,076.2 | 722,432, |
| 429.5 | 125,819.9 | 23,756.2 | 18,755.6 | 2,146.3 | 70,150.3 | 18,764.5 | 751,283, 4 |
| 437.0 | 129,853.9 | 25,477.3 | 18,936.0 | 2,164.7 | 72,804.1 | 19,119.5 | 787,28.9 |
| 44.0 | 134,378.7 | 26.982 .6 | 19,381.4 | 2,210.3 | 75,398.0 | 19,684.9 | 827,274.0 |
| 1.7x | 2.1 x | 2.8x | 3.1 x | 0.8x | 5.3x | 4.7x | 3.9x |
| 1.6x | 2.1 x | 2.6 x | 3.0x | 0.9x | 5.1x | 5.1x | 3.8x |
| 1.6x | 2.1 x | 2.4 x | 3.0x | 0.8x | 4.9x | 5.0x | 3.6x |
| 1.6x | 2.0x | 2.3x | 2.9x | 0.8x | 4.8x | 4.8x | 3.4 x |
| 80.1 | 22,070.6 | 5,907.5 | 4,221.7 | 24.12 | 17,011.8 | 5,267.2 | 128,792.8 |
| 89.3 | 25,054.3 | 6,859.3 | 4,477.2 | 249.8 | 18,569.9 | 3,900.4 | 148,510. 1 |
| 90.8 | 25,831.7 | 7,248, | 4,527.6 | 266.4 | 20,267.3 | 5,004, | 156,461.5 |
| 92.2 | 26,700.5 | 7,62.6 | 4,662.0 | 279.5 | 21,390.0 | 5,635.5 | 165,305.3 |
| 193\% | 17.2\% | 27.0\% | 22.9\% | 10.5\% | 25.2\% | $26.2 \%$ | 17.8\% |
| 20.8\% | 19.9\% | 28.9\% | 23.7\% | 11.6\% | 26.5\% | 20.8\% | 19.8\% |
| 20.8\% | 199\% | 28.4\% | 23.9\% | 12.3\% | 27.8\% | 26.2\% | 199\% |
| 20.8\% | 199\% | 28.3\% | 24.1\% | 12.6\% | 28.4\% | 28.6\% | 20.0\% |
| 8.8x | 12.1x | 10.3x | 13.3x | 7.6x | 21.2x | 18.0x | 22.0x |
| 7.9x | 10.7x | 8.9x | 12.7x | 7.3x | 19.4 x | 24.4 x | 9.1x |
| 7.8x | 10.3x | 8.4 x | 12.4 x | ${ }_{69} 9$ | 17.8x | 19.0x | 18.1 x |
| 7.6x | 10.0x | 8.0x | $12.1 \times$ | 6.6 x | 16.8x | 16.9x | 17.1x |
| 11.9x |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| \$0.06 | \$14.84 | \$3.26 | 56.88 | 51.13 | \$4.48 | \$4.07 | \$99.26 |
| \$0.07 | \$16.42 | \$3.90 | \$7.69 | \$1.21 | \$4.97 | \$2.39 | \$115.82 |
| \$0.07 | \$17.48 | \$4.14 | 57.89 | \$1.36 | \$5.39 | \$3.74 | \$128.64 |
| \$0.08 | \$18.44 | \$4.41 | 58.31 | \$1.43 | \$5.76 | \$4.32 | \$138.38 |
| 18.7x | 20.6 x | 17.4 x | 21.0x | 10.6x | 30.5 x | 29.8x | $47.1 x$ |
| 14.7x | 18.6x | 14.5x | 18.8x | 9.8x | 27.4x | 50.7x | 40.4 x |
| 14.1x | 17.5x | 13.6x | 18.4x | 8.7x | 25.3x | 32.4x | 36.4 x |
| 12.9x | $16.6 x$ | 12.8x | 17.4x | 8.3x | 23.6x | 28.1x | 33.8x |
| - | 6.4\% |  | 5.2\% | . | 4.1\% | 0.5\% | 2.8\% |
| . | 6.8\% | - | 5.4\% | - | 4.4\% | 1.1\% | 3.2\% |
| 49.2 | 14,613.5 | 3,958.1 | 2,650.7 | 103.3 | 14,710.3 | 931.8 | $88,343.5$ |
| - | 520.81 |  | 57.77 | . | \$5.93 | \$1.33 | \$148.00 |
| - | 14.7x | - | 18.6x | - | 23.0x | - | $31.6 x$ |
| 3.0x | 39x | 3.2x | - | 0.9x | 7.4x | 1.2x | 5.9x |

Source: Company reports, Bloomberg, and Institutional Research Group estimates.

# HIDDEN OPPORTUNITIES 

"Valuing possible breakups by providing sum-of-the-parts analysis."

## Industry M\&A Activity

In terms of M\&A activity, recent transactions in the broad Pulp, Paper \& Packaging sector have averaged $\sim 8.0$ x trailing 12 -month EV/EBITDA, $\sim 7.5 \mathrm{x}$ forward 12-month EV/EBITDA and 1.3x EV/sales (see Breakdown \#3). [Note: the following exhibit excludes Cascades’ September 2019 purchase of Orchard Paper, which was in bankruptcy, for $\$ 207$ million (or $\sim 4.6 x$ the $\$ 45$ million of adjusted EBITDA that is expected to be generated, on a run-rate basis, in 2021).] Additionally, we would note that UFS's recent transactions in the Personal Care space averaged 8.3x (see Background \#7 in the "Background" section of this report).

Breakdown \#3 Selected Pulp, Paper \& Packaging Sector Transaction Multiples (\$ in millions)

| Announced | Target | Buyer | $\frac{\text { TTM }}{\text { EV/EBITDA }}$ | $\xrightarrow[\text { EV/EBITDA }]{\text { FTM }}$ | EV/Sales |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Nov-05 | Georgia Pacific | Koch Industries | 7.7 x | 7.3 x | 1.1x |
| Sep-10 | Cellu Tissue | Clearwater Paper | 6.0x | - | 1.0x |
| Apr-13 | Buckeye Technologies | Georgia Pacific | 7.6x | - | 1.9x |
| Sep-13 | Boise Inc. | Packaging Corp. of Amer. | 6.7 x | 6.4 x | 0.8x |
| Jan-14 | New Page Holdings | Verso Corp. | 5.8x | - |  |
| Dec-14 | Dunn Paper, Inc. | Clearwater Paper | 6.2 x | - | - |
| Oct-15 | Wausau Paper | SCA Americas | 12.4 x | 8.7x | 1.8x |
| May-16 | Weyerhaeuser (fluff Pulp unit) | International Paper | 6.3 x | - | 1.5x |
| May-17 | US Corrugated Inc. (certain assets) | WestRock Co. | 5.0x | - | - |
| May-17 | Tembec Inc. | Rayonier Advanced Materials | 5.5x | - | - |
| Dec-17 | ChamPaper (specialty paper unit) | Sappi Limited | 5.9x | - | - |
| Mar-18 | Suzano SA | Fibria Celulose | 10.8 x | - | - |
| Apr-18 | Caieiras Specialty (paper mill) | Ahlstrom Brasil | 8.2x | - | - |
| Jul-18 | Expera Specialty Solutions | Ahlstrom Munksjo Oyj | 8.5 x | - | - |
| Aug-18 | P.H. Glatfelter (specialty paper unt) | Pixelle Specialty Solutions | 11.9x | - | - |
| Oct-18 | Resolute Forest Prod. (S.C. paper mill) | New-Indy Containerboard | 12.9x | - | - |
| Oct-19 | Orora Ltd. (Australasian Fibre unit) | Nippon Paper | 11.5 x | - | - |
| Nov-19 | Verso (specialty paper unit) | Pixelle Specialty Solutions | 7.7x | - | - |
| Nov-19 | TC Transcontinental (paper \& packaging) | Hood Packaging Corp. | = | = | $\underline{0.8 x}$ |
| Average |  |  | 8.2x | 7.5x | 1.3x |

Source: Company reports, Bloomberg, and Institutional Research Group estimates.

## Pulp \& Paper Segment

Public comparables to UFS's Pulp \& Paper segment could include Cascades Inc. (CAS CN), PH Glatfelter (NYSE: GLT), International Paper (NYSE: IP), Neenah Paper (NYSE: NP), Packaging Corp. of America (NYSE: PKG), Resolute Forest Products (NYSE: RFP), Stora Enso (STERV FH), UPM Kymmene (UPM FH) as well as pulp players, such as Canfor Pulp Products (TSE: CFX), Metsa (METSA FH), Mercer International (NASDAQ: MERC) and Suzano SA (SUZB3


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## HIDDEN OPPORTUNITIES

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BZ), who purchased Fibria Celulose (formerly FIBR3 BZ) in 2019, which trade, on average, at ~8.0x 2022E EBITDA, albeit in a wide range of roughly 3.0x-11x. (See Breakdown \#2.)

Applying a discounted/low-end multiple of 5.0 x to 2022 E segment EBITDA of $\$ 425$ million yields a segment value of roughly $\$ 2.12$ billion, or $\sim \$ 38$ per share (see Breakdown \#4). For additional context, this segment valuation implies EV/Sales and EV/Asset multiples of 0.6 x , respectively.

Breakdown \#4 Domtar Corporation: Estimated Value of Pulp \& Paper Based on 2022E EBITDA (\$ in millions, except per share amounts; shares in millions)


Source: Company reports, Bloomberg, and Institutional Research Group estimates.
As well, a discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis based on our forecasts, a weighted average cost of capital of $6 \%-8 \%$, and a terminal EBITDA multiple of $4.5 x-5 \cdot 5 x$, yields an enterprise value, at the mid-point, of $\sim \$ 2.12$ billion (see Breakdown \#5).


## HIDDEN OPPORTUNITIES

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Breakdown \#5
Domtar Corporation: Discounted Cash Flow Analysis of Pulp \& Paper Segment
(\$ in millions)

|  | 2020E | 2021E | 2022E | 2023E | 2024E | 2025E | $\begin{aligned} & \text { CAGR } \\ & 21-25 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Revenue | \$3,503.7 | \$3,659.4 | \$3,697.1 | \$3,604.7 | \$3,514.5 | \$3,426.7 | (0.4\%) |
| EBITDA | 269.0 | 338.5 | 425.2 | 432.6 | 421.7 | 394.1 | 7.9\% |
| Less: Depreciation \& Amortization | (215.5) | (210.4) | (203.3) | (198.3) | (193.3) | (188.5) |  |
| EBIT | \$53.6 | \$128.1 | \$221.8 | \$234.3 | \$228.4 | \$205.6 |  |
| Less: Taxes @ 20.0\% | (10.7) | (25.6) | (44.4) | (46.9) | (45.7) | (41.1) |  |
| Tax-affected EBIT | \$42.8 | \$102.5 | \$177.5 | \$187.4 | \$182.8 | \$164.5 |  |
| Plus: Depreciation \& Amortization | \$215.5 | \$210.4 | \$203.3 | \$198.3 | \$193.3 | \$188.5 |  |
| Less: Capital Expenditures | (\$127.9) | (\$265.3) | (\$274.5) | (\$126.2) | (\$123.0) | (\$119.9) |  |
| Less: Changes in Working Capital | \$0.0 | \$0.0 | \$0.0 | \$0.0 | \$0.0 | \$0.0 |  |
| Unlevered Free Cash Flow | \$130.4 | \$47.6 | \$106.3 | \$259.5 | \$253.0 | \$233.0 |  |


|  | A | B |  |  | C |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Discount | Discounted <br> Cash Flows | PV of Terminal Value as a <br> Multiple of 2025E EBITDA |  |  | Firm Value |  |  |
| Rate | 2017E-2025E | 4.5 x | 5.0x | 5.5x | 4.5 x | 5.0x | 5.5x |
| 6.0\% | \$733 | \$1,328 | \$1,476 | \$1,623 | \$2,061 | \$2,209 | \$2,357 |
| 7.0\% | \$709 | \$1,267 | \$1,408 | \$1,549 | \$1,977 | \$2,118 | \$2,258 |
| 8.0\% | \$687 | \$1,210 | \$1,344 | \$1,478 | \$1,897 | \$2,031 | \$2,165 |

Source: Company reports, Bloomberg, and Institutional Research Group estimates.

## Personal Care Segment

The Personal Care segment could be compared to publicly traded peers such as Asaleo Care (AHY AU), Essity AB (ESSITYB SS), Hengan International (1044 HK), Kimberly-Clark (NYSE: KMB), Ontex Group (ONTEX BB), Procter \& Gamble (NYSE: PG), Svenska Cellulosa (SCAB SS), and Unicharm Corp. (8113 JP), which trade, on average, at 12x 2022E EBITDA albeit, again, in a wide range of $6.5 \mathrm{x}-17 \mathrm{x}$ (see Breakdown \#2). Additionally, we would note that UFS's transactions in the Personal Care space averaged 8.3x (again, see Background \#7 in the "Background" section of this report).

Applying an 8.ox multiple to 2022E EBITDA of $\$ 132$ million yields a segment value of roughly $\$ 1.05$ billion, or nearly $\$ 19$ per share (see Breakdown \#6). Again, for additional context, this segment valuation implies EV/Sales and EV/Asset multiple of $\sim 1.0 \mathrm{x}$ and 0.85 x , respectively.


## HIDDEN OPPORTUNITIES

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Breakdown \#6 Domtar Corporation: Estimated Value of Personal Care Based on 2022E EBITDA (\$ in millions, except per share amounts; shares in millions)

|  | Personal Care |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2021E Revenue |  | \$1,015.5 |  |
| Revenue growth est. |  | 2.0\% |  |
| 2022E Revenue |  | \$1,035.8 |  |
| Operating margin |  | 7.0\% |  |
| Operating income |  | \$72.5 |  |
| EBITDA margin |  | 12.8\% |  |
| 2022EEBITDA |  | \$132.1 |  |
| Applied multiple | 7.5x | 8.0x | 8.5 x |
| Enterprise value | \$990.5 | \$1,056.5 | \$1,122.5 |
| Diluted shares | 55.7 | 55.7 | 55.7 |
| Per share basis | \$17.78 | \$18.97 | \$20.15 |

Source: Company reports, Bloomberg, and Institutional Research Group estimates.
A discounted cash flow analysis assuming compound annual top-line growth of about $1.5 \%$, and relatively steady operating and EBITDA margins, a weighted average cost of capital of $6 \%-8 \%$, and a terminal EBITDA multiple of $7.5 \mathrm{x}-8.5 \mathrm{x}$, results in an enterprise value, at the mid-point, of $\$ 1.085$ billion (see Breakdown \#7).

Breakdown \#7 Domtar Corporation: Discounted Cash Flow Analysis of Personal Care Segment (\$ in millions)

|  | 2020E | 2021E | 2022E | 2023E | 2024E | 2025E | $\begin{aligned} & \text { CAGR } \\ & 21-25 \\ & \hline \end{aligned}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Revenue | \$1,005.4 | \$1,015.5 | \$1,035.8 | \$1,051.3 | \$1,061.8 | \$1,072.4 | 1.3\% |
| EBITDA | 129.2 | 129.5 | 132.1 | 136.7 | 138.0 | 139.4 | 1.5\% |
| Less: Depreciation \& Amortization | (58.8) | (58.4) | (59.6) | (57.8) | (58.4) | (59.0) |  |
| EBIT | \$70.4 | \$71.1 | \$72.5 | \$78.8 | \$79.6 | \$80.4 |  |
| Less: Taxes @ 20.0\% | (14.1) | (14.2) | (14.5) | (15.8) | (15.9) | (16.1) |  |
| Tax-affected EBIT | \$56.3 | \$56.9 | \$58.0 | \$63.1 | \$63.7 | \$64.3 |  |
| Plus: Depreciation \& Amortization <br> Less: Capital Expenditures | $\begin{gathered} \$ 58.8 \\ (\$ 35.2) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \$ 58.4 \\ (\$ 40.6) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \$ 59.6 \\ (\$ 46.6) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \$ 57.8 \\ (\$ 52.6) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \$ 58.4 \\ (\$ 53.1) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \$ 59.0 \\ (\$ 53.6) \end{gathered}$ |  |
| Less: Changes in Working Capital | \$0.0 | \$0.0 | \$0.0 | \$0.0 | \$0.0 | \$0.0 |  |
| Unlevered Free Cash Flow | \$79.9 | \$74.6 | \$71.0 | \$68.3 | \$69.0 | \$69.7 |  |
| A + |  | B |  | = |  | C |  |


| Discount | Discounted Cash Flows | PV of Terminal Value as a Multiple of 2025E EBITDA |  |  | Firm Value |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Rate | 2017E-2025E | 7.5x | 8.0x | 8.5 x | 7.5x | 8.0x | 8.5x |
| 6.0\% | \$298 | \$781 | \$833 | \$886 | \$1,079 | \$1,131 | \$1,183 |
| 7.0\% | \$290 | \$746 | \$795 | \$845 | \$1,035 | \$1,085 | \$1,135 |
| 8.0\% | \$282 | \$712 | \$759 | \$807 | \$994 | \$1,041 | \$1,089 |

Source: Company reports, Bloomberg, and Institutional Research Group estimates.


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## HIDDEN OPPORTUNITIES

"Valuing possible breakups by providing sum-of-the-parts analysis."
Accounting for corporate costs of capitalized at less than 6.0x, or the weighted average segment multiple, as well as projected net debt of roughly $\$ 910$ million, yields a sum-of-the-parts valuation of roughly $\$ 2.0$ billion, or about $\$ 37$ per share (Breakdown \#8).

## Breakdown \#8 Domtar Corporation: Sum-of-the-Parts Fair Value Estimate

(\$ in millions, except per share amounts; shares in millions)


Source: Company reports, Bloomberg, and Institutional Research Group estimates.


# HIDDEN OPPORTUNITIES 

"Valuing possible breakups by providing sum-of-the-parts analysis."

## The Wrap-Up

For background, UFS was previously covered by the Hidden Opportunities Report from March 2017 until its achievement of our fair value estimate in January 2018 (a period in which the stock returned $\sim 39.5 \%$ compared with $16 \%$ and $17 \%$ gains in the S\&P 500 and Russell 2000, respectively). Notably, since that time UFS's share price has declined $\sim 49 \%$ (compared with a $18 \%$ gain in the S\&P and a $\sim 7.0 \%$ decline in the Russell) albeit with the bulk of the decline occurring amid the pandemic in 2020. Within this context, in August 2020, UFS disclosed a review of potential strategic alternatives for its Personal Care (PC) division, which, as noted in our original report, has a markedly divergent product set and growth profile (as well as requires different manufacturing, technology and marketing strategies) when compared with the company's core-Pulp \& Paper (P\&P) division. Moreover, we continue think the PC segment could garner a premium valuation from a range of strategic partners (while also attracting interest from private equity suitors) and that as a standalone the P\&P segment, which is in the process of repurposing a portion of its production assets toward the attractive packaging sector, could itself become an takeover/go-private target.

As such, with shares trading at less than 5.0x 2022E EV/EBITDA and a discount to tangible book value we estimate the stock is undervalued, particularly relative to the potential value creation from the separation/monetization of its PC unit and the potential attractiveness of a standalone P\&P business to strategic acquirers.

Considering management commentary, peer, and M\&A valuations as well as discounted cash flows, value of $\$ 38$ per share and $\$ 19$ per share can be assigned to UFS's Pulp \& Paper and Personal Care businesses. Accounting for corporate costs and projected net debt of $\sim \$ 20$ per share yields a base case sum-of-the-parts value of roughly $\$ 37$ per share (with bull/bear cases of ~\$31-\$42 per share).

Risks include a lack of management execution, labor disputes, competition, raw material/currency fluctuations, and/or weakening end-market demand due to an economic recession/pandemic or technological disruption.



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